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About the Transparency Vanuatu National Integrity System Study Discussion Papers Series 
The National Integrity System (NIS) study follows a methodology developed by the Transparency 
International Secretariat in Berlin. This methodology provides the structure of the report and identifies the 
questions to be addressed. The Vanuatu NIS study examines 13 key institutions, or “pillars”: legislature, 
executive, judiciary, ombudsman, auditor general, public service, law enforcement, media, private business, 
customary authorities, electoral commission, political parties and civil society. The research aims to develop 
consensus of the key recommendations for change. Each pillar discussion paper is based upon review of laws, 
documents and interviews. Discussion papers are released to the advisory group, external reviewer and the 
public. The discussion paper is a work-in-progress. All comments, corrections or additions are welcome. 
Comments are requested by the end of March 2014. Comments can be returned to Transparency Vanuatu in 
writing or in person (contact details above). They can also be sent to the lead researcher at 
anita.jowitt@gmail.com. If you would like to be added to the email list to be notified when further discussion 
papers are released or when public meetings on the report are held please contact Transparency Vanuatu. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
A new Clerk of Parliament assumed his position in June 2013, and the management of Parliament is 
undergoing some change. The operation of Parliament has become more open, with video and audio 
now being broadcast live. Recordings are also available on the website. The backlog of Hansards has 
also been reduced and a number of other plans to strengthen the functioning of committees with 
the assistance of agencies such as UNDP and the Parliament of Queensland are underway. The 
administration of parliament does, however, suffer from lack of human resources.  
 
Whilst the administration of the legislature is developing there is considerable concern about the 
performance of members of parliament. Parliament is currently comprised of representative of 16 
political parties and 4 independent members of parliament (mps). This necessarily means 
government is a coalition. Coalitions are unstable and motions of no confidence are frequent. The 
causes of instability are discussed further in the foundations section, and are a reflection of both the 
socio-cultural environment in which democracy operates, and the simple fact that democracy, and 
the values associated with it are new. As such, instability is not able to be simply cured by law 
reforms. 
 
Internal politicking, including changes in executive positions, occurs in order to maintain coalitions or 
succeed in motions of no confidence. This weakens the ability for the legislature to play its role as 
the central accountability mechanism for public entities and expenditure. It also distracts members 
of parliament from their role as representatives of the people. Public trust in mps is low and mps do 
little to inform their constituencies about the work of parliament or represent their concerns in 
parliament. There is also little public information about Bills, or opportunities for the public to 
contribute to discussion associated with the legislative changes. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. Parliament should be the “hub” of accountability, whereby other agencies report to it. It 
should also be a source of information on activities, via annual and other reports presented 
to parliament. Currently it does not serve this function. It is recommended that: 
a. Standing orders be reviewed to include a requirement that lists of documents to be 
tabled, as well as Bills, is issued prior to Parliament, and that this list be published to 
both members of parliament and the public. 
b. Procedures of Parliament be reviewed to require that every report tabled in 
Parliament is to be public unless matters of national security require otherwise, and 
made available through the Parliament library. 
c. External monitoring of work currently being undertaken to strengthen parliamentary 
committees to allow them to fulfil their role as an accountability mechanism occurs. 
 
2. There is very limited training for members of parliament and little technical support. It is 
recommended that measures to increase both training of and technical support for 
parliamentarians be considered. This training should include components related to ethics 
and integrity for members of parliament, as well as more mechanical training on processes 
and procedures. 
 
3. There is concern about the extent to which members of parliament account for their own 
allowances. There has also been dissatisfaction at increases in members’ allowances. It is 
recommended that: 
a. Consideration be given to establishing an independent body to set the allowances of 
members of parliament. This could possibly be modelled on New Zealand’s law. 
b. The matter of representation allowances, and how to control them, be considered. 
Options to consider include: 
i. requiring members to publically account annually for their representation 
allowances.  
ii. removing the distribution of representation allowances from the control of 
members and instead give members a role as conduits of project proposals 
that are forwarded to the Parliamentary Management Board or another 
body to decide upon. 
iii. providing allowances to political parties, rather than individual members, to 
distribute. 
 
4. There is little communication between members of parliament and the public, and little 
public information on matters going before parliament. This may be, in part, due to no 
requirement in the Standing Orders that information, including copies of Bills be made 
publically available. Short time frames between when members receive Bills and Parliament 
sits also hinders opportunities for consultation. It is recommended that the Standing Orders 
be reviewed to ensure that the public receives information before parliament sits, and that 
members have adequate time to consult on Bills. 
 
5. In practice integrity mechanisms are almost entirely dysfunctional. In additions to 
recommendations made in the Ombudsman’s pillar it is recommended that: 
a. the Leadership Code Act is revised to ensure that annual returns are scrutinised on 
an annual basis 
b. automatic penalties (such as ceasing to be paid salary) are implemented for leaders 
who fail to file returns 
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6. There is public interest in changing the law to require higher educational qualifications for 
candidates standing for election as members of parliament. The Law Reform Commission 
should explore whether it is appropriate to amend the eligibility criteria for candidates 
contained Representation of the People Act.  
 
 
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
 
Vanuatu’s constitutional form is a representative democracy. Parliament is formed through national 
elections which occur at intervals of no more than four years.1 Parliament is unicameral and is 
comprised of 52 members. Once parliament is elected the members of parliament collectively form 
the legislature. The executive is drawn from parliament, with members voting to elect the prime 
minister,2 who then appoints his (Vanuatu has only ever had male prime ministers) cabinet.3 The 
Speaker of Parliament and one or more Deputy Speakers are elected by Parliament.4  Two ordinary 
sessions of Parliament are held each year, in March and August. Extraordinary sessions can be called 
outside of these times.5 
 
There are currently 8 standing committees of Parliament, the Standing Orders Review Committee, 
the Institutions Committee, the Privileges Committee, the Committee on Economic Policy, the Public 
Accounts Committee, the Committee on Social Policy, the Committee on the Members of Parliament 
Ethics and Integrity and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and External Trade.6 Each is made up of 7 
members of parliament, selected by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. No 
members of standing committees can be Ministers. As discussed in the foundations and executive 
sections, frequent changes in Ministers mean that committees are largely comprised of new 
members of parliament and less prominent backbenchers.  
 
The Parliament Administration Act [Cap 306] came into force in 2006 and outlines the administrative 
structure of Parliament. This Act establishes a 4 member Parliamentary Management Board, 
comprised of the Speaker of Parliament, the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition and the 
Parliamentary Counsel.7 The Parliamentary Management Board has the responsibility for overseeing 
the management of Parliament, including parliamentary committees.8 The primary administrator is 
the Clerk of Parliament, who is appointed by the President on advice of the Parliamentary 
Management Committee.9 The Act requires 4 Assistant Clerks to be appointed,10 along with other 
staff as is necessary.11 There is also provision for the Speaker to directly appoint staff to assist him.12 
 
  
                                                          
1
 Article 21(1), Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
2
 Article 41, Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
3
 Article 42, Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
4
 Article 22, Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
5
 Sections 3 – 6, Parliament (Administration) Act [Cap 306].  
6
 http://www.parliament.gov.vu/Committees/Committees.html [accessed 26 February 2014]. 
7
 Section 12, Parliament Administration Act [Cap 306]. 
8
 Section 10, Parliament Administration Act [Cap 306]. 
9
 Section 15, Parliament Administration Act [Cap 306]. 
10
 Section 16, Parliament Administration Act [Cap 306]. 
11
 Section 17, Parliament Administration Act [Cap 306]. 
12
 Section 20, Parliament Administration Act [Cap 306]. 
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RESOURCES (LAW) 
 
To what extent are there provisions in place that provide the legislature with adequate financial, 
human and infrastructure resources to effectively carry out its duties? 
 
Members set their own levels of allowances. However, there are few statutory requirements as to 
administrative support that must be provided to the legislature. 
 
Section 22(1) of the Parliament (Administration Act) [Cap 306] provides that ‘prior to each fiscal 
year, the Board must direct the Clerk of Parliament to prepare an estimate of the sums that 
Parliament will be required to provide for the payment of the expenses of Parliament and its 
Members.’ The Clerk must also ‘prepare the estimate for Parliament within the ceiling established 
for Parliament for the fiscal year by the Council of Ministers.’13 By law Members of Parliament set 
their own allowances, including representation and travel allowances.14 The estimate provided by 
the Clerk of Parliament must include these statutorily determined sums.  
 
In terms of human resources the law requires the appointment of a Clerk of Parliament and four 
Assistant Clerks.15 Whilst other staff can be appointed there is no statutory requirement that they be 
appointed, although there is an assumption, in law, that Parliamentary Counsel will exist.16  
 
 
RESOURCES (PRACTICE) 
 
To what extent does the legislature have adequate resources to carry out its duties in practice? 
 
Although individual members are provided with adequate allowances, the efficient administration of 
parliament is hindered by resource issues. Part of the resource issues stem from lack of human 
resources and part stems from management issues. 
 
The operations of Parliament are hindered, in part by lack of staff and in part by issues relating to 
management of staff.17 Whilst Parliament does maintain a library there is no currently no 
mechanism to ensure that copies of all reports tabled in Parliament get placed in the library.18 
Observation indicates that much of the material in the library is out of date.  
 
There is particular inadequacy in the area of committee resources. Whilst financial resources are 
committed for the sitting of committees, and for committees to conduct activities, human resource 
support is lacking. One Assistant Clerk is responsible for all committees.19 The work of the 
committees is further hindered by frequent changes in the executive and government, as these 
result in the composition of committees changing. UNDP is currently supporting Vanuatu Parliament 
to employ a technical advisor to support the work of the Public Accounts Committee.20 The 
                                                          
13
 Section 22(2), Parliament (Administration Act) [Cap 306]. 
14
 Parliament (Members Expenses & Allowances) Act [Cap 109]. 
15
 Part IV, Parliament (Administration Act [Cap 306]. 
16
 Section 12, Parliament (Administration Act [Cap 306]. 
17
 Interview with of Louis Kalnpel, Clerk of Parliament with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 18 October 2013. 
18
 Interview of Leiwia Moli, Parliament Librarian with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila 18 October 2013. 
19
 Interview of Leon Teter Assistant Clerk, Parliamentary Committees with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 28 August 
2013. 
20
 Interview with of Louis Kalnpel, Clerk of Parliament with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 18 October 2013. 
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functioning of committees has also been a particular focus of support via a Parliamentary twinning 
programme with the Parliament of Queensland.21  
 
Summarised proceedings have not been published regularly. However, a new Clerk was appointed in 
mid 2013, and he is working with the Hansard division to clear this backlog and improve reporting.   
Proceedings from 2007 – 2010 were published in August 2013.22 Improvements to the Parliamentary 
sound system and recording should help to ensure the production of Hansards. The latest 
improvements, introduced after July 2013, include facilities to broadcast Parliament live over the 
internet and television, as well as radio. The November 2013 sitting of Parliament was the first to be 
broadcast in this manner.23   This project has been implemented by the New Caledonia Congress 
with the assistance of the Agence de Development  Economic de la Novelle Caledonie (ADECAL).  
 
Each member of parliament is provided with an office, equipped with computer facilities. There is 
one legislative counsel to support the 52 members of parliament. In practice she supports the 
executive.24 Political factions do not maintain their own parliamentary researchers or support staff 
although, as discussed in the section on the executive, members of the executive are supported by 
political advisors. As members of parliament set their own representation and travel allowances 
these should be adequate. Members of parliament are currently provided a representation 
allowance 387,167 vatu per month (US$3870).25 This allowance combines their “salary” and an 
annual allocation of 2 million vatu (US$20,000) to be spent in their constituency.26 There is no 
requirement that members of parliament account for the constituency allocation in any way. There 
are also, apparently, proposals to raise the MPs allocation to 10 million vatu (US$100,000) for some, 
or all, MPs.27 As discussed in the foundations section, there is a concern that this leads to clientelistic 
politics, where candidates for election to parliament are voted for based on what they can give to 
their supporters, rather than what policies for national development they advocate.   
 
Street survey research conducted by NIS researchers in late 2013 indicated that 90% of the 50 
respondents thought that MPs were corrupt. Forty percent (40%) wanted to see changes to the MPs 
allocation.28 A follow up survey in 2014 with a further 50 respondents indicated that 80% of 
respondents thought that mp’s allocations were not allocated fairly, with a further 8% being unsure 
if allocation was fair or not. The main reasons why allocations were seen to be unfair were that 
people perceived that MP’s allocations were distributed only to voters/political supporters, or 
distributed only to families and friends (including wantoks and communities that were directly 
related to the MP). 
 
A smaller survey, with only 25 respondents, was then conducted, to find out if dissatisfaction was 
due to not receiving allocations. Levels of dissatisfaction were slightly lower to those found in the 
                                                          
21
 Interview of Leon Teter Assistant Clerk, Parliamentary Committees with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 28 August 
2013. 
22
 Interview with of Louis Kalnpel, Clerk of Parliament with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 18 October 2013. 
23
http://www.parliament.gov.vu/Home%20Page%20Archived/2013/Parliament%20Debate%20Streaming%20L
ive%20Online.html [accessed 27 February 2014]. 
24
 Interview with of Louis Kalnpel, Clerk of Parliament with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 18 October 2013. 
25
 Parliament (Members’ expenses and allowances) Amendment Act 2012. 
26
 Email from Ralph Regenvanu, Minister of Lands to Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, November 10, 2010; 
https://www.facebook.com/notes/vote-against-merging-of-vanuatu-mp-allocation-and-salary/email-from-mp-
ralph-regenvanu/140403422677768 [accessed 27 February 2014]. 
27
 Opposition Office Press Statement, 4 February 2014. 
28
 https://www.dropbox.com/s/m7hza7n0j36axb6/Press5.pdf [accessed 11 March 2014]. 
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first survey, with 72% of respondents thinking MP’s allocations were distributed unfairly, and a 
further 6% not being sure if distribution was fair. Interestingly of those that thought the allocation 
was unfair, 61% had received goods or money from an MP’s allocation. A further 22% had received 
something, but were unsure if the goods or money they had received were from the MP’s allocation, 
or from another source.  Less surprising, maybe, is that of those who thought the allocation was fair, 
75% had received goods or money from an MP’s allocation. 
 
Concern has also been expressed over the extent to which all members of parliament fully 
understand their duties.29 There have been calls to change the educational qualifications required to 
be eligible to stand as a candidate.30 A street survey carried out by researchers as part of the 
national integrity system research indicates that there is considerable public support for this 
proposal.31 The issue was also debated in Vanuatu’s youth parliament in November 2013, with youth 
parliamentarians voting in support of a mock Bill to increase the educational qualifications required 
to be eligible to stand as a candidate for election.32 Training of members of parliament is limited. 
Whilst induction programmes have been conducted for new members following the 2008 and 2012 
national elections, these programmes are take place over a week, so are necessarily superficial.  
 
 
INDEPENDENCE (LAW) 
 
To what extent is the legislature independent and free from subordination to external actors by law? 
 
There are comprehensive laws seeking to ensure the independence of the legislature. 
 
Parliament has a fixed life of 4 years and can only be dissolved earlier by the vote of an absolute 
majority of members of Parliament when ¾ of members are present or by the President acting of the 
advice of the Council of Ministers. If Parliament is dissolved early then once a new Parliament is 
established following elections it cannot be dissolved in the first 12 months of its life.33 
 
In addition to the two ordinary sessions each year extraordinary sessions can be held at any time on 
the request of the Speaker, the Prime Minister or the majority of members of parliament.34 In the 
event that the Speaker refuses to call an extraordinary session the matter can, and has, been taken 
to court. 
 
The Clerk prepares the Agenda for each sitting day of Parliament, although the Speaker can add 
items.35 The Speaker and Deputy Speakers are elected by Parliament.36 Parliament also controls the 
                                                          
29
 Interview with of Louis Kalnpel, Clerk of Parliament with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 18 October 2013; Michael G 
Morgan Integrating Reform: Legislative Needs Assessment, Republic of Vanuatu (Technical Report for UNDP, 
March – April 2001). 
30
 Transparency Vanuatu, 2012 Vanuatu General Election, Election Observer Team Report, (Port Vila: 
Transparency Vanuatu, 2013). 
31
 https://www.dropbox.com/s/2vl2oag1g3s7spy/Press2.pdf. 
32
http://www.parliament.gov.vu/Home%20Page%20Archived/2013/Youth%20Parliament's%20role%20in%20P
olitical%20Party%20reform%20highlighted.html [accessed 27 February 2014]. 
33
 Article 28, Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
34
 Section 6, Parliament Administration Act [Cap 306]. 
35
 Order 17(1), Standing Orders of Parliament.  
36
 Article 22(1), Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
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establishment of parliamentary committees and the appointment of members to these 
committees.37 The committees can include standing committees and ad hoc committees.38 
 
As stated in the section on structure above, the Parliamentary Management Board is comprised of 
the Speaker of Parliament, the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition and the Parliamentary 
Counsel. Administrative staff of Parliament are appointed by this Board, either directly or, in the 
case of the Clerk, by the President on the advice of the Board. 
 
Whilst police do not require special permission to enter Parliament, ‘ No member of Parliament may 
be arrested, detained, prosecuted or proceeded against in respect of opinions given or votes cast by 
him in Parliament in the exercise of his office.’39 Further, no member may be arrested or prosecuted 
for any offence during a session of parliament or one of its committees, unless authorised by 
Parliament.40 
 
 
INDEPENDENCE (PRACTICE) 
 
To what extent is the legislature free from subordination to external actors in practice? 
 
Whilst boycotts and other tactics can be used to attempt to undermine the legislature, the judiciary is 
active in ensuring that the Standing Orders of Parliament are adhered to.  However, internal 
politicking undermines the separation of the executive and the legislature. 
 
In practice the President rarely exercises his power to dissolve Parliament on the advice of the 
Council of Ministers. This last occurred in May 2004, when the Prime Minister was facing a motion of 
no confidence. In June 2011, when there were ongoing issues relating to the position of the Prime 
Minister41 there was some discussion of whether the President would dissolve Parliament. This did 
not, however, occur. 
 
On a number of occasions the Speaker has attempted to close sessions of Parliament, or not call 
extraordinary sessions. This is often done to avoid debates on motions of no confidence either in the 
government or the Speaker. In these instances the court does intervene to ensure that 
Parliamentary process is followed. Another common tactic to avoid the progress of debates is for 
factions to boycott sittings, thereby ensuring no quorum can be established. 
 
The Executive dominates the agenda of the legislature. In the past 5 years all Bills have originated 
with the government. Whilst there are sometimes complaints that Bills are presented late, the 
unstable and frequently changing nature of Vanuatu’s executive means that it is not accused of 
undue interference. However, there are concerns about the lack of separation of the executive and 
the legislature.42 One way in which this is indicated is by the lack of debate on many Bills. It is not 
uncommon for a Bill to pass through all stages of the legislative process in or two days.43  
                                                          
37
 Article 23, Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
38
 Part VIII, Standing Orders of Parliament. 
39
 Article 27(1), Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
40
 Article 27(2), Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
41
 See judiciary discussion paper for further details. 
42
 Interview with of Louis Kalnpel, Clerk of Parliament with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 18 October 2013. 
43
 Based on a review of Hansards by the author. 
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Indeed it is the unstable nature of Vanuatu’s executive that is the biggest threat to the independent 
functioning of the legislature comes. Motions of no confidence are frequent. Even if the Prime 
Minister does not change, changes in Ministerial positions in order to alter the balance of power 
within governing coalitions and maintain the Prime Minister are also frequent. When attention is 
focussed on internal politicking either legislative business does not proceed, or matters are not 
properly scrutinised. 
 
 
TRANSPARENCY (LAW) 
 
To what extent are there provisions in place to ensure that the public can obtain relevant and timely 
information on the activities and decision-making processes of the legislature? 
 
Despite the constitutional requirement that proceedings of Parliament are to be held in public other 
rules relating to the operation of Parliament do not support transparency. 
 
The Constitution states that ‘Unless otherwise provided proceedings of Parliament shall be held in 
public.’44 The Standing Orders provide that ‘visitors may be admitted only to such places as may be 
reserved for them by the Speaker. Visitors shall be properly dressed and they shall remain seated 
and silent.’45 The Speaker may also ‘order the withdrawal of visitors in special circumstances’46 
although special circumstances are not defined. 
 
Whilst the Clerk is required to send members a list of Bills at least 15 days prior to the 
commencement of an ordinary Parliamentary session47 there is no requirement that the list of Bills 
be made available to the public. Copies of Bills, in English and French, must be made available to 
members at least 10 days prior to the session at which they are to be debated.48 There is no 
requirement that copies of Bills be made available to the public. There is no requirement that a list 
of documents to be tabled and debated be sent. Whilst documents to be tabled are provided in the 
daily agendas49 and tabled documents are to be recorded in the Minutes,50 again there is no 
requirement that daily agendas be made public.  
 
The law does not require verbatim recordings of sessions to be made. Nor does the law require that 
voting records must be made public. There is no provision on the standing orders for the public to 
directly submit written questions to the legislature. Whilst the issue of reviewing the Standing 
Orders was identified as a priority during the Comprehensive Reform Programme initiated in the late 
1990s, revised Standing Orders still have not been introduced. 
 
                                                          
44
 Article 24, Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
45
 Order 53(1), Standing Orders of Parliament. 
46
 Order 53(2), Standing Orders of Parliament. 
47
 Order 12(4), Standing Orders of Parliament. 
48
 Order 26(2), Standing Orders of Parliament. 
49
 Order 17, Standing Orders of Parliament. 
50
 Order 20, Standing Orders of Parliament. 
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Proceedings of standing committees are not open to the public other than during the hearing of 
evidence.51 Reports of standing committees also confidential until they have been presented in 
Parliament.52 
 
There is no legal requirement that Parliament provides annual reports in respect of its operations. 
Nor is there any requirement that members of parliament account for their representation 
allowances. 
 
 
TRANSPARENCY (PRACTICE) 
 
To what extent can the public obtain relevant and timely information on the activities and decision-
making processes of the legislature in practice? 
 
Whilst it is possible to view Parliamentary sessions now, it is not easy to gain information prior to 
parliament sitting. There is also very little transparency in respect of the use of member’s 
representation allowances. 
 
As discussed above, major improvements with public access to Parliament have occurred in late 
2013. Facilities to broadcast parliamentary sessions over the television and the internet have been 
installed. The November-December session of Parliament was broadcast on television as well as the 
radio. The videoed sessions are archived on Parliament’s website and available for anyone to access, 
although links are currently not working. 
In the past there have been significant delays in the publication of Hansards, so the public has not 
been able to get timely access to records. Hansards, which are summarised records, are now 
available for sessions up to 2010. These contain brief voting records, in that members who vote 
against the Bill or abstain are recorded. Many Bills are passed unanimously, and records do not 
record which members were present during the vote. They do not contain information on 
documents that have been tabled, although it is unknown if this is because documents are not 
tabled. 
Gaining information prior to sessions is difficult. Whilst Parliament does publish lists of Bills on its 
website, the Bills themselves are not made available to the public. Nor is information on documents 
to be tabled made available. Whilst the media reports on activities within Parliament this often is 
done after debates have taken place. As a result of being unable to access information prior to 
parliamentary sessions media is unable to assist in generating public debate on matters that will be 
arising. In order to get Bills before sessions reliance must be placed upon personal contacts. It is not 
usual for members of parliament to hold public meetings or consultations on matters, although this 
does sometimes occur. A notable instance prior to the November 2013 session of Parliament was 
public consultations by the Minister of Lands on proposed changes to land laws. The actual Bills 
themselves were not made publically available however. Instead a booklet summarising proposed 
changes was distributed. It is not usual for members of public to submit questions via their elected 
representatives to be asked during legislative question time. 
                                                          
51
 Rule 36(1), Procedural Guidelines Standing Committees. 
52
 Rule 36(2), Procedural Guidelines Standing Committees. 
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Budgets of Parliament are published as part of the annual government budget. There is no 
subsequent public reporting of how this budget is used.  
Whilst a small number of members of Parliament have voluntarily published a statement of how 
they have spent their representation allowances, this is the exception, rather than the rule. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY (LAW) 
To what extent are there provisions in place to ensure that the legislature has to report on and be 
answerable for its actions? 
Whilst Parliament is accountable to the courts for the constitutionality of its decisions, and must 
consult with the public on some amendments to the Constitution accountability of individual 
legislators to other bodies such as the Auditor General and the Ombudsman is extremely limited. 
The only regular review of legislative activities is conducted by the Auditor General as part of his 
general duty to audit and report to Parliament and the government on public accounts.53 However, 
as discussed in the section on transparency above, there is no auditing of how individual members 
use their representation allowances. This is because they are paid as a “salary” so the powers of the 
Auditor General only extent to ensuring that allowances have been paid to members.  
The Supreme Court has the authority to review any Bill that has been passed by the parliament.54 
This usually happens when Bills are referred by the President to the Supreme Court prior to their 
promulgation. However the Supreme Court can also review Acts that have been brought into force. 
  
The only time that public consultation is required by law is when a Bill to amend ‘a provision of the 
Constitution regarding the status of Bislama, English and French, the electoral system, or the 
parliamentary system’ is passed by Parliament. Such a Bill can only come into law if it is supported by 
a public referendum.55  
 
The Ombudsman is tasked to handle complaints regarding breaches of the leadership code and 
maladministration. The powers of the Ombudsman are discussed further in the Ombudsman section 
of this report. It can be observed that the Ombudsman only has the power to make 
recommendations. As discussed in the judiciary section of this report, the judiciary is also active in 
overseeing the activities of the legislature, and in particular adherence to the Standing Orders. 
 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY (PRACTICE) 
 
To what extent do the legislature and its members report on and answer for their actions in practice? 
 
Accountability to the court occurs when matters are placed before it. Little proactive accountability 
via other mechanisms occurs. 
 
There is very little consultation of the public by the legislature, either as a group or through 
individual legislators. Whilst standing committees are established to debate various issues, debate is 
often limited to the members of committees and does not enter the public domain. Indeed a recent 
                                                          
53
 Article 25(5), Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
54
 Article 16(3), Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
55
 Article 86, Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
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survey conducted by Transparency Vanuatu indicted that improving consultations was the main 
measure that the public wanted the legislature to undertaken.56 
 
Whilst the public can make complaints to the Ombudsman, as discussed in that section very little 
action occurs as the result of Ombudsman’s reports. This may have contributed to the decline in the 
number of public complaints being made to the Ombudsman.  
 
There is no regular reporting of the legislature either to the public, or to state bodies. However, Bills 
are regularly presented to the Supreme Court to determine their constitutionality. Further, as 
discussed in the section on the judiciary, active oversight of adherence to Standing Orders occurs 
when cases are brought before the court. 
 
Constitutional immunity provisions in respect of liability for statements made during parliamentary 
debate are not often used. The last instance occurred in 2004, when the then Prime Minister was 
prosecuted for contempt of court for comments made during a parliamentary debate on a motion of 
no confidence. It was held that privilege applied.57  
 
 
INTEGRITY MECHANISMS (LAW) 
 
To what extent are there mechanisms in place to ensure the integrity of members of the legislature? 
 
The Leadership Code Act is fairly comprehensive although the lack of public disclosure or other 
regular scrutiny of annual returns weakens their effectiveness as an accountability mechanism. 
 
The two main sources of integrity rules are the Standing Orders of Parliament and the Leadership 
Code Act.  The Leadership Code Act generally requires that ‘ A leader must behave fairly and 
honestly in all his or her official dealings with colleagues and other people, avoid personal gain, and 
avoid behaviour that is likely to bring his or her office into disrepute. A leader must ensure that he or 
she is familiar with and understands the laws that affect the area or role of his or her leadership.’58  
Leaders include, but are not limited to, members of parliament.  
 
Whilst members of Parliament cannot hold public office59 there is no specific restriction on private 
sector activities. The Standing Orders do, however, require members of Parliament to inform the 
Speaker of political party affiliations and of ‘ all companies, businesses or other  organizations in 
which he has any pecuniary interest of any kind whether direct or indirect  as owner, employee, 
partner, shareholder or otherwise.’60 The Speakers is required to keep records of all private sector 
interests61 and members are prohibited in participating in any debate or vote without first disclosing 
their interests.62 The Leadership Code Act also contains provisions relating to conflict of interest.  
                                                          
56
 https://www.dropbox.com/s/rhkjosbau0b7r20/Press3.pdf. 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/m7hza7n0j36axb6/Press5.pdf. 
57
 Vohor v Public Prosecutor [2004] VUCA 23. 
58
 Section 3, Leadership Code Act [Cap 240]. 
59
 Section 25, Leadership Code Act [Cap 240]. 
60
 Order 52(1)(b), Standing Orders of Parliament. 
61
 Order 52(2), Standing Orders of Parliament. 
62
 Order 52(4), Standing Orders of Parliament. 
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Leaders must disclose personal interests63 must divest themselves of assets likely to create conflict 
with their duties64 and must not act in any matter where they have a conflict of interest.65 They are 
also restricted in accepting loans66 and limited in having beneficial interests in government 
contracts.67 There are, however, no post-employment restrictions. 
 
In order to help ensure that leaders are not using their positions for personal gain they are required 
to make annual returns. These annual returns must also be filed for their spouse, children and trusts 
of which they are beneficiaries.68 The annual returns must detail: 
 
(a) all land and other property (except one family home); 
(b) all vehicles (except one family vehicle); 
(c) all shares in public or private companies; 
(d) all income; 
(e) all liabilities; 
(f) directorships in corporations; 
(g) all directorships or other offices held in unincorporated bodies; 
(h) any assets acquired or disposed of during the period covered by the return; 
(i) any liabilities acquired or discharged during the period covered by the return.69  
 
These returns should record gifts and hospitality. Further, there is provision in the Act to regulate for 
the receipt of gifts to the State,70 although no such regulations have been made. Accepting gifts 
under custom is not a breach if done openly and follows traditionally practice.71 There is no 
requirement that a record of contact with lobbyists is kept. Annual returns are provided to the Clerk 
of Parliament who must keep them confidential, although they can be released to other parties 
pursuant to an investigation or prosecution of breaches of the law.72 The Clerk must also publish in 
the Gazette, by March of each year, a list of those who have filed annual returns and those who have 
failed to do so.  
 
Breaches of the Leadership Code Act are criminal offences and can be prosecuted. 
 
 
INTEGRITY MECHANISMS (PRACTICE) 
 
To what extent is the integrity of legislators ensured in practice? 
 
There is a complete absence of enforcement of the Leadership Code Act. 
 
                                                          
63
 Section 16, Leadership Code Act [Cap 240]. 
64
 Section 18, Leadership Code Act [Cap 240]. 
65
 Section 24, Leadership Code Act [Cap 240]. 
66
 Section 21, Leadership Code Act [Cap 240]. 
67
 Section 26, Leadership Code Act [Cap 240]. 
68
 Section 31, Leadership Code Act [Cap 240]. 
69
 Section 32(4), Leadership Code Act [Cap 240]. 
70
 Section 10(2), Leadership Code Act [Cap 240]. 
71
 Section 10(1), Leadership Code Act [Cap 240]. 
72
 Section 32, Leadership Code Act [Cap 240]. 
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List of leaders who have filed or not filed annual returns are not consistently published in the 
gazette. Even when leaders fail to file returns, and it is published, no further action is taken. The last 
Ombudsman’s public report on this topic was published in 2009, and related to 188 leaders who had 
failed to file annual returns in 2007.73 
 
Nobody is empowered in law to scrutinise the content of these returns unless there an investigation 
for a breach of the Leadership Code Act [Cap 240] has been commenced, and as a result there is no 
regular scrutiny of the content of annual returns. As a result, even if they are filed, they are 
ineffective as an accountability mechanism. 
 
Despite a number of Ombudsman reports recommending that further action be taken due to 
apparent breaches of the Leadership Code Act no prosecutions have been initiated. In the past 5 
years reports which have recommended prosecution of members of the legislature for breaches of 
the Leadership Code Act [Cap 240] have included: a report on former member of parliament for 
breaches of the Leadership Code Act associated with his involvement in abetting forgery;74a report 
on a then member of parliament for breaches of the Leadership Code Act associated with his 
conviction for abetting an assault;75 a report on the Prime Minister and his cabinet for breaches of 
the Leadership Code Act associated with not complying with the Government Contracts and Tenders 
Act;76 reports, in 2007, 2008 and 2009 recommending prosecution for leaders who have failed to file 
annual returns under the Leadership Code Act;77 and a report on misuse of personal office for 
private gain by the then Speaker of Parliament.78 
 
 
EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT  
  
To what extent does the legislature provide effective oversight of the executive? 
 
                                                          
73
 Office of the Ombudsman, Public Report on the Failure of 188 Leaders who failed to Submit Annual Returns 
for 2007 19 August 2009 http://www.paclii.org/vu/ombudsman/2009/1.pdf [accessed 27 February 2014]. 
74
 Office of the Ombudsman, Vanuatu: Public Report on the Breach of the Leadership Code Act by Malon 
Hospmander and Andre Lesines 15 October 2010 http://www.paclii.org/vu/ombudsman/2010/3.html 
[accessed 27 February 2014]. 
75
 Office of the Ombudsman, Vanuatu: Public Report on the Impeachment of the Leadership Code Act by 
Honourable Harry Iauko, and Jay Ngwele through their convictions at the Magistrate Court 21 October 2011 
http://www.paclii.org/vu/ombudsman/2011/2.pdf [accessed 27 February 2014]. 
76
 Office of the Ombudsman, Vanuatu: Public Report on the Breaches of the Government Contracts and Tenders 
Act, The Leadership Code Act And Financial Regulations in Relation to Vanuatu Holdings 2 May 2008 
http://www.paclii.org/vu/ombudsman/2008/3.html [accessed 27 February 2014]. 
77
 Office of the Ombudsman, Vanuatu: Public Report on the Failure of 156 Leaders who Failed to File Annual 
Returns for 2005 23 March 2007 http://www.paclii.org/vu/ombudsman/2007/3.pdf [accessed 27 February 
2014]; Office of the Ombudsman, Vanuatu: Public Report on the Failure of 177 Leaders who Failed to file 2006 
Annual Returns 11 January 2008 http://www.paclii.org/vu/ombudsman/2008/1.pdf [accessed 27 February 
2014]; Office of the Ombudsman, Vanuatu: Public Report on the Failure of 188 Leaders who Failed to Submit 
Annual Returns for 2007 19 August 2009 http://www.paclii.org/vu/ombudsman/2009/1.pdf [accessed 27 
February 2014] 
78
 Office of the Ombudsman, Vanuatu: Public Report on the Breach of Leadership Code in using Public Office for 
Personal Gain by Honourable Sam Dan Avock Speaker of Parliament and the Abuse of Section 3 of the Official 
Salaries Amendment Act 1989 by the Honourable Prime Minister 14 May 2007 
http://www.paclii.org/vu/ombudsman/2007/4.pdf [accessed 27 February 2014]. 
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Whilst the legislature has some power to scrutinise the executive it is not consistent in fulfilling this 
role. Internal politicking and weak committee structures hinder the legislature from acting as an 
effective check on the executive. 
 
The legislature does not have the power to establish commissions of inquiry. Instead this power is 
vested in the Minister of Justice.79 The legislature can, however, establish ad hoc committees to 
investigate Bills or matters raised in motions.80 It can also establish a standing committee ‘in order to 
examine, enquire or consider any business, question or matter related to a ministry, department or 
service of the Government or the Republic of Vanuatu.’81 Whilst a number of standing committees 
are established they do not release regular reports which indicate the extent to which they provide 
effective oversight of the government.  
 
Whilst the legislature approves the national budget through Appropriation Acts, it is not very 
effective in scrutinising public expenditure. This is largely due to weaknesses in the functioning of 
the public account committee, and lack of parliamentary action when the public accounts 
committee does report. Whilst the Parliament (Administration) Act requires all Ministers to prepare 
an annual report for Parliament82 recent Hansards have not recorded any public debate on these 
reports. Some decisions are, however, challenged.  In mid 2013 the Opposition sought judicial 
review over an agreement that the government had signed with a private company to court.83 Whilst 
the review was unsuccessful parliament has established an ad hoc committee to investigate the 
agreement. One of the most controversial provisions is the issuing of promissory notes. Promissory 
notes must be approved by Parliament.84 
 
The main mechanism for controlling the executive is motions of no confidence. However, as 
discussed in the foundations section and the section above on independence, Vanuatu’s political 
environment is very unstable. Motions of no confidence, or rumours of motions of no confidence, 
are frequent. In this environment members of parliament, where members of parliament stand to 
gain by shifts in the government and executive posts, motions of no confidence are largely seen as a 
self serving device, rather than a device to hold the executive to account. 
 
A number of key office holders, including the Ombudsman and the Chief Justice, are appointed in 
consultation with both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, ensuring independence 
in these posts. 
 
 
LEGAL REFORMS  
 
To what extent does the legislature prioritise anti-corruption and governance as a concern in the 
country? 
 
                                                          
79
 Section 1, Commissions of Inquiry Act [Cap 85]. 
80
 Order 48, Standing Orders of Parliament. 
81
 Order 49, Standing Orders of Parliament. 
82
 Section 23, Parliament Administration Act [Cap 306]. 
83
 Vanuaroroa v Republic of Vanuatu [2013] VUCA 41. 
84
 Sections 59 & 60, Public Finance and Economic Management Act [Cap 244]. 
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Whilst a major international Convention in the area of anti-corruption has been ratified, there is no 
clear programme of developing national laws to respond to issues of corruption. 
 
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption was ratified in 2010.85 No specific legislative 
reforms have occurred in furtherance of compliance with this Convention, however. Changes in 
government make it difficult for the legislature to embark on and adhere to a comprehensive anti-
corruption law reform agenda, and also make it difficult to assess the degree to which there is 
commitment for such an agenda. The current Carcasses government released a “100 day plan” when 
it first came into power. This plan contained a list of actions, some of which had a clear anti-
corruption focus. Example actions include:  
 
17. Establish a “Public Concerns Monitoring Group” headed by the Ombudsman with secretarial 
support from the Office of the Ombudsman and comprised of representatives from VANGO, 
VCC, VCCI, Malvatumauri, Auditor General’s Office and others, with a mandate to identify 
and raise key issues of public concern with the Government, to advise and assist the 
Government to address these concerns, and to liaise with the public. This group also able to 
receive submissions on such issues 
19. Amend the Ombudsman Act to re-instate the power of the Ombudsman to institute a civil 
case against a leader to recover misappropriated funds 
20. Amend the Leadership Code Act to remove the prerequisite requirement for conviction 
under the Penal Code for conviction for breach of the Leadership Code 
21. Insert a new section into the Ombudsman Act to allow anyone, including the Ombudsman, 
to prosecute a leader for breach of the Leadership Code if the Public Prosecutor has not 
commenced proceedings three months after issuing of a Report alleging breaches 
23. Establish high-level ‘Constitutional Review for Political Reform’ Committee and complete 
consultation with all political parties on amendment of Constitution to reform the political 
system, ready for wider consultation86 
 
However, none of these actions have been completed. Less than a month after the Prime Minister 
convened a meeting of political party leaders to begin addressing political reform a motion of no 
confidence was tabled. Whilst this motion was defeated, 4 ministerial portfolios changed.87 The 
government has stated that it remains committed to political reform,88 but there are concerns that if 
political reform is not in the personal interests of parliamentarians it will not be successful. 
  
Whilst a number of positive law reforms are listed in the anti-corruption activities section, there 
have also been some reforms that appear to facilitate corruption. Somewhat controversial reforms 
include changes to passport laws. Vanuatu has historically been embroiled in a number of passport 
scandals, particularly relating to diplomatic passports.  A new Passports Act was introduced in 2009, 
and a number of diplomatic passports were cancelled after this new law.89 However, in 2010 it was 
                                                          
85
 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Ratification) Act 2010. 
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 ‘Carcasses Government releases 100 Day List’ Vanuatu Daily Digest, 11 April 2013 
http://vanuatudaily.wordpress.com/2013/04/11/carcasses-government-releases-100-day-list/ [accessed 27 
February 2014]. 
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avoid-no-confidence-motion/5286952 [accessed 11 March 2014]. 
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 Ibid. 
89
 ‘New Agency to Stamp Out Illegal Passport Trade in Vanuatu’ Radio Australia 14 October 2009 
http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/new-agency-to-stamp-out-illegal-
passport-trade-in-vanuatu [accessed 7 March 204]. 
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reported in the Daily Post the more non citizens held diplomatic passports than citizens.90 In 2011 
the Passports Act was amended to allow non-citizens to hold Vanuatu diplomatic passports, and this 
was seen, by some, as facilitating the corrupt sale of diplomatic passports.91 
 
Changes to laws surrounding election petitions have also been controversial. Whilst it has always 
been the case that election petitions on the grounds of improper conduct will only be successful if 
the improper conduct affected the result of the election, the law also used to provide that if a 
candidate were convicted of an election offence, then his or her election would be declared invalid. 
This provision was removed in 2012, and replaced with a much narrower provision relating to 
spending or allocating money during a set period around elections.92  
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30 October 2010. 
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